




Income Loss and Financial Distress during COVID-19: The 
Protective Role of Liquid Assets  
 
Stephen Roll 
Research Assistant Professor 
Social Policy Institute 
Brown School 





Department of Social Work 





Nearly a quarter of U.S. households have experienced job or income losses related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Liquid assets mitigate financial distress in the face of financial shocks 
such as job loss, yet this relationship in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic is unknown. Using 
a nationally representative sample of U.S. households (N = 4,383) who completed a survey in the 
early days of the pandemic, we examined pre-pandemic liquid assets as a moderator of the 
relationship between job and income loss and difficulty meeting financial obligations and use of 
high-cost financial resources. Estimates from propensity score-weighted linear probability 
models indicated that greater liquid assets lessened the probability of experiencing all eight 
measures of financial distress and most measures of distress among households experiencing job 
or income losses. Policy efforts to help households build emergency savings can help households 
better prepare for future pandemics while also supporting public health responses.   
  
INTRODUCTION 
The COVID-19 pandemic introduced a public health and economic crisis unlike we have ever 
seen in the U.S. Stay at home, social distancing, and other public health measures to slow the 
spread of the coronavirus greatly disrupted daily routines, including work, educational, and 
economic activities. The result is a macro economic crisis comprised of simultaneous demand, 
supply, and financial shocks. Consumers are traveling less and purchasing fewer goods and 
services that bring them into close contact with others, global supply chains are disrupted, and 
financial service systems are facing liquidity strains (Brinca, Duarte, & e Castro, 2020; Triggs & 
Kharas, 2020). 
The tripartite macroeconomic shock of COVID-19 is greatly affecting U.S. households. 
The unemployment rate more than tripled in just two months—from 3.8% in February to 14.4% 
in April 2020, eclipsing the highest rate during the Great Recession (Kochhar, 2020a). In an 
April 2020 survey, almost a quarter of respondents said they or someone in their households 
experienced a job or income loss due to COVID-19. These losses were much higher than average 
among Hispanic, low-income, and young adults (Despard, Grinstein‐Weiss, Chun, & Roll, 
2020). Roughly half of the jobs lost in the early weeks of the pandemic have been regained. 
However, the rate of job recovery has been lower among Hispanic men, black workers, those 
with less than a college education, and mothers with school-age children (Long, Van Dam, 
Fowers, & Shapiro, 2020).  
Despite passage of the $2.2 trillion Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act - which included stimulus payments and additional unemployment benefits, and a 
partial economic recovery, U.S. households continue to struggle financially. Since the beginning 
of major efforts to slow the spread of the coronavirus in March 2020, a quarter of households 
have had trouble paying their bills, a third have dipped into assets – including retirement savings 
to pay bills, and 17% have received food assistance in their communities (Parker, Minkin, & 
Bennett, 2020). Unsurprisingly, households that have experienced a job or income loss during 
COVID-19 were two to three times more likely to experience a range of material hardships, even 
after controlling for income and demographic characteristics (Despard, Grinstein‐Weiss, et al., 
2020). Over half (57%) of U.S. households surveyed in July 2020 who said they experienced an 
employment disruption since March 2020 and were not receiving unemployment benefits said 
they were "just getting by" or "finding it difficult to get by". This proportion dropped only to 
46% among those received unemployment benefits (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2020). 
The degree to which households can weather a major economic storm such as COVID-19 
may depend on their financial standing entering the crisis, particularly their liquid assets such as 
emergency savings. Yet many households are liquidity constrained; nearly half lack emergency 
savings equal to three or more months of ordinary expenses (FINRA [Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority] Investor Education Foundation, 2019). Almost a third of households 
would not use cash to pay for an unexpected $400 expense (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2020) and nearly half could not come up with funds to cover a $2,000 expense 
within 30 days (Lusardi, Schneider, & Tufano, 2011). 
Liquidity is an important aspect of financial health. The ability to access $2,000 in an 
emergency is a strong predictor of subjective financial well-being, controlling for other factors 
such as income (Sun, Kondratjeva, Roll, Despard, & Grinstein‐Weiss, 2018). Liquid assets have 
a buffering effect with respect to material hardship (Gjertson, 2016; Sabat & Gallagher, 2019), 
including amidst financial shocks such as a job loss (Despard, Guo, et al., 2018; McKernan, 
Ratcliffe, & Vinopal, 2009). The buffering effect of liquid assets is important given the 
commonality of typical financial shocks; nearly 60% of households experienced a shock such as 
a drop in income, major car repair, and trip to the hospital in 2014 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 
2017).  
 Of course, there is nothing usual about the macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic as a shock affecting nearly all U.S. households. Spells of unemployment are 
prolonged, returns to work are uneven as re-opening plans change, and various forms of public 
assistance are intermittent and in some cases, difficult to access.  
Amidst the uncertainty of COVID-19, it is important to understand households' financial 
resilience. Using a nationally representative sample of 5,038 households who completed a survey 
between April 29 and May 20 concerning the economic impacts of COVID-19, we examined 
how liquid assets mitigate financial distress amidst job and income losses. Findings from our 
study can guide public policies to help financially gird households against major events like 
COVID-19 and ensure that economically vulnerable households do not face a disproportionate 
level of risk for material hardship.  
Public policies that enable households to financially withstand a global event like 
COVID-19 have important public health implications. Individuals able to remain stably housed 
and who do not feel financially compelled to engage in high-risk employment or other income 
generating activities are more likely to comply with important stay at home and social distancing 




JOB AND INCOME LOSS DURING COVID-19 
The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate in the U.S. peaked at 14.7% in April 2020, just 
weeks after stay at home and social distancing measures were enacted in response to the 
coronavirus outbreak, eclipsing the Great Recession's peak of 10.0% in October 2009. The 
unemployment rate in 2020 has since dropped in every month since April to a current level of 
7.9% in September (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020a). The number of employed workers 
dropped by 20.5 million from February to May 2020 – a 13% decline compared to a 5% decline 
during the Great Recession (Kochhar, 2020b). 
Unemployment and reduced work hours have not been experienced equally. The loss in 
employed workers was four percentage points greater among women compared to men, and 
greater among female and male Black, Asian, and Hispanic workers compared to White workers. 
By age, the loss in employed workers was 25% among those 16 to 24 years old – 12 to 16 
percentage points higher than all other age groups. By education, the loss in employed workers 
was 17% among those with a high school diploma compared to 6% of those with a college 
degree or higher (Kochhar, 2020b).  
The drop in employed workers across different demographic categories may in part 
reflect voluntary work separations. Examining job and income loss at the household level offers 
a more complete picture of the economic effects of COVID-19. An August 2020 Pew Research 
Center survey of 13,200 U.S. adults found that 42% of respondents said they or someone in their 
household had lost a job or taken a pay cut because of COVID-19. This rate was highest for 
Hispanic (53%), followed by black (43%) and white (38%) respondents; by age, this rate was 
highest among those 18 to 29 years old. Lower-income respondents were also more likely to 
experience a job loss or pay cut than middle or upper income respondents (Parker et al., 2020). 
Disparities in employment and income losses are related to industries hard hit by 
COVID-19 due to social distancing guidelines including leisure and hospitality, education, health 
services, and retail. These industries employ greater proportions of women, people of color, 
younger people, and people with less education (Kochhar, 2020a). Telework also helps explain 
these disparities. A quarter to a third of workers have worked from home at different periods 
during COVID-19. Those who work from home are more likely to have higher educational 
attainment and be employed in white collar industries. Teleworkers are also more likely to be 
Asian or White than Black or Hispanic, and to be 25 years or older (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2020b). 
Roughly half of the jobs lost during these early stages have been recovered, yet the initial 
job losses and subsequent recoveries have not been experienced equally. For example, white 
women have regained 61% of the jobs they lost while black women have regained only 34% 
(Long et al., 2020).  
HOUSEHOLD LIQUIDITY AND FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
A household's liquid assets – amounts held in checking and savings accounts, cash, and pre-paid 
debit cards – are resources to be drawn upon if and when income is insufficient to cover 
household expenses like rent, car payments, and food and to cover large and irregular expenses 
(e.g., repair or replace a major household appliance). Liquid assets can help households avoid 
financial distress, such as over-drafting bank accounts and falling behind on credit card 
payments. Entering the COVID-19 pandemic, households' liquid assets could be used to help 
meet basic needs following a job loss or drop in work hours, particularly for households waiting 
for or ineligible to receive unemployment assistance.  
 Having liquid assets lessens the risk for material hardship (Despard, Guo, et al., 2018; 
Gjertson, 2016; McKernan et al., 2009; Sabat & Gallagher, 2019) – difficulties meeting basic 
needs (Beverly 2001) such as paying rent and utility bills. Among a sample of 1,760 households 
living in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods, Gjertson (2016) found that those who said 
they or their spouse or partner save for emergencies were less likely to experience any one of 
five types of hardship within the past 12 months. However, this study did not measure the 
amount of liquid assets.  
Liquid assets are especially important to forestall financial distress and material hardship 
in the wake of financial shocks. Analyzing data from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), McKernan et al. (2009) compared households with 
and without enough liquid assets to cover three months of consumption at the federal poverty 
level. Those with this level of liquid assets were less likely to experience material hardship 
following a financial shock such as a job loss or departure of a parent from the household. This 
decreased likelihood was greater among households in the bottom two-third of the income 
distribution. Despard et al. (Despard, Guo, et al., 2018) found that among a sample of low-
income tax filers, the direct effect of financial shocks on material hardship was 90.5% of the total 
effect, while the indirect effect of liquid assets, measured as a continuous variable, was 9.5%. 
That is, a small proportion of the effect of shocks on hardship was mitigated by liquid assets. A 
follow-up study found that this indirect effect – as moderated by race – was nearly two and three 
times less among Hispanic and Black households, respectively, compared to White households 
(Despard, Grinstein-Weiss, Guo, Taylor, & Russell, 2018). 
 A common rule of thumb is for households to have at least three months' worth of living 
expenses in liquid assets – a standard that only slightly more than half of U.S. households can 
attain (FINRA Investor Education Foundation, 2019). Yet lesser amounts of liquid assets may be 
sufficient for coping with shocks. Sabat and Gallagher (2019) found that liquid assets of $2,467 
with a 95% confidence interval of $1,814 to $3,011 predicted the steepest decline in the risk of 
experiencing a material hardship. This amount is a little more than a month of living expenses at 
the federal poverty level for a family of four—much less than the three months' standard used by 
McKernan et al. (2009) to predict hardship.  
Use of Credit-Based Alternative Financial Services 
A sign of financial distress in households may be turning to credit-based alternative financial 
services (CAFS) offered by non-bank businesses such as payday, auto title, and pawnshop loans. 
These products are designed to meet consumers' short-term credit needs (Carter, 2015)—
particularly households that have exhausted their liquid assets and have little choice but to turn to 
CAFS to avoid an eviction, utility cut-off, or hunger.  
CAFS use may reflect financial distress rather than a desire to meet just a short-term 
need. Over two-thirds of borrowers use payday loans to pay for ordinary household expenses 
such as for housing and food; only 16% use these loans to deal with an expense shock such as a 
car repair (Horowitz, Bourke, & Roche, 2012). Access to payday lending is associated with 
increased probability of experiencing food insecurity (Chang, 2019) while CAFS use itself is 
associated with food insecurity (Bartfeld & Collins, 2017).  
CAFS use may also exacerbate financial distress. Annualized interest rates on these loans 
exceed 300% (Bertrand & Morse, 2011; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013; Edmiston, 
2011) while only 36% of initial loans are repaid, ending a loan sequence. More than 80% of 
payday loans are renewed within two weeks (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2014), 
suggesting that borrowers become trapped in high-interest cycles of debt to cope with cash flow 
problems (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013). On average, borrowers take out eight 
loans in a year and pay $520 in interest (Horowitz et al., 2012). 
Liquid assets appear to be negatively associated with CAFS. For example, Despard et al. 
(2017) found that an increase in $500 in liquid assets was associated with lesser odds of using 
CAFS among lower-income tax filers. Brobeck (2008) found that low- and moderate-income 
(LMI) households with less than $500 in emergency savings were more likely to use CAFS than 
LMI households with $500 or more in savings.  
The evidence reviewed above indicates that liquid assets may help buffer the adverse 
effects of events like job and income loss with respect to financial distress, including use of high-
cost credit. Yet whether liquid assets mitigate the effects of shocks on hardship may depend on 
the type and magnitude of the shocks. Prior research measures ordinary shocks like the need for 
a car repair whereas shocks related to and experienced during a global pandemic such as 
COVID-19 may be different.  
Also, the relationship between liquid assets and material hardship may be bi-directional 
(Gjertson, 2016); when income routinely falls short, a household cannot build liquid assets. For 
example, Despard et al. (2020) found that households' ability to cover usual expenses explains a 
substantial proportion of variance in the likelihood of having emergency savings. Thus, it is 
important to measure liquid assets at the start of a period during which material hardship is 
observed. Furthermore, evidence concerning how varying levels of liquid assets are associated 
with financial distress – including in the wake of financial shocks - is limited and not yet 
determined with respect to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. For households affected by 
COVID-19 job and income losses, liquid assets may lessen the likelihood of financial distress.  
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & STUDY PURPOSE 
The precautionary savings motive holds that individuals insure against future income uncertainty 
by building assets (Leland, 1978) and change consumption to meet liquidity targets to help 
smooth consumption in anticipation of future changes in income (Carroll, 1997; Deaton, 1991). 
Accumulating assets thus may provide households with readily available resources to drawn 
down to smooth consumption when income proves insufficient.  
Liquid assets – cash, checking and savings account balances, and prepaid debit cards - 
can help households respond to ordinary financial shocks, such as a car repair or an emergency 
room visit. In helping households cope with these shocks, liquid assets can help households 
avoid financial distress, such as falling behind on credit card payments, over-drafting bank 
accounts, and/or turning to high-cost credit such as payday loans. Yet the degree to which 
households are financially prepared to cope with a job and/or income loss due to a major, 
unexpected, and global event like the COVID-19 pandemic is unknown.  Accordingly, our 
research questions are: 
RQ1: Are COVID-19 related job and/or income losses associated with a greater likelihood of 
experiencing financial distress?  
RQ2: Are higher levels of liquid assets associated with lesser likelihood of financial distress? 
RQ3: Does the relationship between levels of liquid assets and the likelihood of financial distress 
vary based on COVID-19 related job and/or income loss?  
Our study fills a gap in knowledge by examining how households are faring 
economically during a global pandemic whereas prior research examined ordinary and 
idiosyncratic events, such as a car breaking down. Furthermore, we assess the link between 
shocks and financial distress measuring liquid assets at the beginning of a period during which 
hardship might have been experienced to eschew the bi-directional nature of assets and hardship. 
These features of our study help determine the degree to which liquid assets help households 
cope with the economic fallout of COVID-19. 
Findings from our study can help inform public policies designed to help households deal 
with the economic fallout of unforeseen macroeconomic shocks. Households need financial 
supports in the immediate aftermath of these events, yet policies aimed at helping households 
build liquid assets to insure against these events may prove even more effective. 
METHODS 
Sample and Data  
Data for this study come from the Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19 Survey, which was 
fielded by researchers at Washington University in St. Louis from April 27, 2020, to May 12, 
2020, using Qualtrics online panels. The panel used in this study was developed using quota 
sampling techniques to ensure that the sample approximated United States demographic 
characteristics in terms of age, gender, race/ethnicity, and income.1  
The survey response rate was 10.8%, with 16,200 adults entering the survey. Of these 
respondents, 8,564 were excluded because they failed to meet quota requirements to ensure 
national representativeness on the established sampling criteria, 1,541 were excluded because 
they failed quality checks embedded in the survey, and 51 were excluded due to not meeting the 
minimum age criteria of 18 years. After these exclusions, 6,044 respondents remained in the 
sample, and 5,038 completed the survey. Additional checks on the characteristics of this sample 
revealed that it also approximated the U.S. population in terms of state of residence, in addition 
 
1 Research has demonstrated that online, non-probability samples using Qualtrics panels generate samples that closely 
approximate those of the General Social Survey, which is considered the gold standard in survey administration (Zack, 
Kennedy, & Long, 2019). 
to the quotas specified above. Finally, we excluded respondents who did not provide a response 
to the questions used in this analysis, resulting in a final analytical sample of 4,757.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables  
The dependent variables in this analysis fall into two broad categories of financial distress. The 
first category captures the extent to which households may be falling behind on their financial 
obligations and expenses during the COVID-19 pandemic, which we operationalize in terms of 
households skipping essential bills, carrying credit card debt from month-to-month (versus 
paying down their entire credit card bill each month), falling behind on their credit card debt, and 
overdrafting from a bank account. To measure skipping essential bills, we asked respondents 
“Was there a time in the past 3 months when you or someone in your household skipped paying 
a bill or paid a bill late due to not having enough money?” (Yes=1, No=0). To measure carrying 
card debt, we asked “In the past 3 months, have you or anyone in your household carried an 
unpaid balance month-to-month on one or more credit cards?” (Yes=1, No=0). To measure 
falling behind on credit card debt, we asked “Are you or anyone in your household behind on 
payments or in collections for one or more credit cards?” (Yes=1, No=0).2 Finally, to measure 
account overdrafts, we asked respondents “In the last 3 months, how many times have you or 
someone in your household over-drafted your bank account or wrote a check for more than what 
was in your account?” For this question, respondents could state that they over-drafted their bank 
account “Never,” “1 time,” “2 times,” or “3 or more times,” but for the purposes of this analysis 
 
2 Analyses using the two credit card-related dependent variables are restricted to households who report 
owning a credit card (n=4,276). 
we collapse this variable into a binary variable coded as 1 if respondents had ever over-drafted 
their account in the prior 3 months, and 0 otherwise.  
The second category of financial distress variables captures the usage of high-cost 
financial resources during the pandemic. We include four types of high-cost financial resources: 
Auto title loans, payday loans, the use of pawn shops, and selling blood plasma. Auto title loans, 
payday loans, and pawn shops are all considered to be credit-based alternative financial services, 
while selling blood plasma may be considered an indicator that a household cannot make ends 
meet out of their regular income streams, and have to turn to alternatives like blood plasma sales 
to supplement income shortfalls.3 For each of these resources, we asked how many times in the 
last 3 months the respondent or someone in their household had used these resources (Never, 1 
time, 2 times, or 3 or more times). Respondents who indicated they had ever used a given 
resource in the past 3 months were coded as 1, and were coded as 0 otherwise.  
The timeframe referenced by each of the above variables gives us confidence that we are 
measuring events that happened during the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted above, the survey 
was administered between April 27, 2020, and May 12, 2020, meaning that the 3-month 
timeframe in the above questions captured the period immediately before the pandemic through 
the large unemployment spike in April and May. However, to ensure that we were actually 
measuring events directly related to the pandemic, we asked a series of follow-up questions to 
 
3 There exists very little academic research on the usage of blood plasma sales and their potential 
consequences for the health and well-being of those that sell blood plasma. Per the Plasma Protein 
Therapeutics Association, an industry trade group, there were more than 53 million plasma “donations,” or 
sales, in 2019 (Plasma Protein Therapeutics Association, 2019). Donors can receive $30 to $50 for each 
donation, and can donate up to twice a week (Shaefer & Ochoa, 2018). The long-term health effects of 
frequent donations remain unclear, however, there are indications that high-frequency use may have short-
term health effects such as fainting, migraines, and reductions in protein and other biomarkers (Dodt, 
Strozyk, & Lind, 2019; Laub, Baurin, Timmerman, Branckaert, & Strengers, 2010). Given these risks, we 
consider blood plasma sales to be a high-cost financial resource. 
respondents ascertaining whether or not a given event was a result of the pandemic. For example, 
if a respondent indicated that their household had skipped an essential bill in the past 3 months, 
we asked if they skipped that bill “due to financial issues caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.” 
Similarly, if a respondent indicated that they used any of the high-cost financial resources we 
study, we asked if they used that resource to “help with financial issues caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic.” We include the results of our estimates using these COVID-19-specific outcomes as 
a robustness check to our main analysis. 
Treatment Variable 
The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated job and income losses can be reasonably considered 
an exogenous shock on households’ finances. Prior to late February, there was extremely low 
awareness of COVID-19 in the United States,4 and the job losses that came in April and May were 
both large and acute—between February and April the unemployment rate increased by a factor 
of more than 4 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020a). As such, it is unlikely that households or 
businesses changed their behavior substantially in the months prior to the pandemic, minimizing 
concerns around the endogeneity of our outcomes with regard to this large economic shock. 
The treatment variable in this study captures whether or not a household lost a job or lost income 
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. To construct the job or income loss variable, we asked 
respondents “Have you lost a job or lost income as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic?” and, if 
they were married or living with a partner, “Has your spouse or partner lost a job or lost income 
as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic?” If respondents answered affirmatively to either of these 
 
4 This is confirmed by examining Google Trends data for online searches of the term “Coronavirus” over the 
past year. Searches were functionally nonexistent through 2019, and only began rising significantly in late 
February. For details, see: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2019-12-01%202020-10-
27&geo=US&q=coronavirus 
questions, they were coded as experiencing a COVID-19-related job or income loss at the 
household level (=1); if they responded negatively to both questions, they were not coded as 
experiencing a COVID-19-related job loss at the household level. 
Independent Variable 
The key independent variable in this analysis, other than the treatment variable, measures the 
amount of liquid assets held by a household prior to the pandemic. To construct our liquid asset 
variable, we first asked respondents whether they owned a checking account, a savings account, 
or held any cash. If respondents reported that they had any of these liquidity sources, we then asked 
respondents to report how much they held in these sources at the time of the survey, and 3 months 
prior (before the pandemic). If respondents reported that they did not have a given liquidity source, 
they were coded as having $0 in that source. Our measure of respondents’ total liquid assets prior 
to the pandemic is thus the sum of the values of each of these liquidity sources. Following the 
construction of the total liquid assets measure, we then divide pre-pandemic liquid assets into 
quartiles. The 1st quartile ranges from $0 to $2,000 in pre-pandemic liquid assets, the 2nd quartile 
ranges from $2,001 to $8,225, the 3rd quartile ranges from $8,250 to $28,600, and the 4th quartile 
includes anyone with more than $28,600 in liquid assets.5 
Control Variables 
The control variables in our model were selected based on their expected correlation with 
selection into experiencing a COVID-19-related job or income loss, or their expected correlation 
with the dependent variables of interest. The array of control variables used in this study include 
 
5 Both liquid asset and income variables in this study are top-coded at the 99th percentile. One other thing to 
note about the liquid asset measure is that there are a disproportionate number of observations in the first 
quartile (n=1,730). This is due to the fact that the quartiles were calculated conditional on ownership of at 
least $1 in liquid assets. Respondents who reported that they had $0 in liquid assets were then included in the 
bottom quartile. 
the respondents’ employment status prior to the pandemic, the employment status of their 
spouse/partner prior to the pandemic, whether they were married or living with a partner, age, 
gender, race/ethnicity, number of children in the household, health insurance status prior to the 
pandemic, current school enrollment, educational attainment, housing status (e.g., own, rent, or 
neither), access to a vehicle, credit card ownership, self-reported physical health prior to the 
pandemic, household income in 2019, and bank account ownership. 
Analytical Approach 
The primary challenge in estimating the impact of COVID-19-related job or income loss on 
household outcomes is that employment losses during the pandemic did not occur at random. For 
example, workers who were lower-income, considered non-essential, who could not work from 
home, or who lived in areas with strict lockdowns were more exposed to the risks of lost 
employment or income than those outside of those categories. These inherent differences may 
also explain variations in the outcomes we examine—if economically vulnerable workers were 
both more likely to experience COVID-19-related job/income losses and more likely to skip 
bills, fall behind on debt payments, or use alternative financial services, our estimates of the 
relationship between job/income loss and these outcomes would be biased. To correct for this 
potential endogeneity, we use propensity score analysis techniques to balance the group who 
experienced a COVID-19-related job/income loss with those who did not on observed covariates. 
 Our study relies on a counterfactual framework in which “treated” (those who 
experienced a COVID-19-related job/income loss) and “comparison” (those who did not 
experience a COVID-19-related job/income loss) have both observable and unobservable 
outcomes (Guo & Fraser, 2014). In this framework, we can use inverse probability of treatment 
weights to balance our sample (Austin, 2011) and calculate the average treatment effect (ATE) 
of COVID-19-related job/income loss on our outcomes of interest. The ATE weights for the 
treated observations in our sample are calculated as 𝑤𝑖 =
1
𝑝(𝑥𝑖)
, while the ATE weights for cases 




 A typical approach to calculating propensity scores uses logistic regression to estimate 
the propensity of experiencing a given treatment, conditional on observed covariates. However, 
model misspecification errors may bias treatment effect estimates in analyses with binary 
outcomes (Drake, 1993; Freedman & Berk, 2008). To address this potential issue, we use 
generalized boosted regression modeling (GBM), a nonparametric approach to estimating 
propensity scores that has been demonstrated to reduce the likelihood of model misspecification 
errors (McCaffrey, Ridgeway, & Morral, 2004). The GBM approach uses automated modeling 
algorithms and machine learning techniques to identify the propensity score weights that 
minimize the overall mean effect size differences between a large array of covariates. To 
estimate propensity scores using GBM, we used the TWANG—Toolkit for Weighting and 
Analysis of Non-equivalent Groups—package (Ridgeway, Morral, Griffin, & Burgette, 2014) in 
STATA. To specify our propensity score model, we estimate the propensity of experiencing a 
COVID-19-related job/income loss conditional on the full array of independent and control 
variables discussed above. Using GBM, we re-estimated this model over 10,000 iterations (or 
“trees”) to find the optimal propensity score weights that minimize the standard differences 
between households that experienced a COVID-19-related job/income loss and those that did not 
on observable characteristics.  
Following the estimation of propensity score weights, we estimate the relationship 
between our outcomes of interest, COVID-19-related job/income loss, and liquid assets, by 
employing two sets of propensity score-weighted linear probability models. The first set of 
models estimates the marginal effects of both COVID-19-related job/income loss and liquid 
assets on our outcomes of interest. This set of models is of the following general form: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝜋 + 𝑖    (1) 
where y is one of eight measured financial distress outcomes for household i, COVID_Shock is 
an indicator capturing whether or not a household experienced a COVID-19-related job/income 
loss, and Liq_Quartile is a categorical variable measuring which of the four pre-pandemic liquid 
asset quartiles a household occupied. 𝛿𝑖 is a vector of the control variables discussed above, and 
𝑖 is an error term. We employ both propensity score weights as well as covariate controls in our 
outcome models in order to minimize the mean square error of our estimated treatment effects; 
an approach known as “doubly robust” estimation (Bang & Robins, 2005; Huppler-Hullsiek & 
Louis, 2002). That is, the covariates we used in our estimation of the propensity scores are also 
controlled for in our outcome models.  
The second set of models estimates the degree to which liquid assets can moderate the 
impact of COVID-19-related job/income loss, as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽3(𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐼𝐷_𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖) +
𝛿𝑖𝜋 + 𝑖    (2) 
where the coefficient 𝛽3 estimates the marginal effect of experiencing a COVID-19-related 
job/income loss and inhabiting a given liquid asset quartile relative to the reference group, which 
in this case is households in the lowest liquid asset quartile who did not experience a job/income 






Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample prior to propensity score weighting. The 
sample well approximates the U.S. population in terms of gender, income, race/ethnicity, and 
age. However, the sample is highly educated as 57% have at least a Bachelor’s Degree. Prior to 
the pandemic, two-thirds of respondents reported being employed either full-time or part-time, 
with the vast majority of these engaged in traditional wage and salary employment rather than 
self-employment. The mean amount of liquid assets held by the sample was around $27,000 
while the median was only $5,500, indicating that this variable is very right-skewed. 
Table 1 also reports the characteristics of those who reported a job or income loss due to 
COVID-19 with those who did not, and includes both the standardized differences between these 
groups and the results of significance tests comparing them. Using the common balance 
threshold of a 0.2 standardized difference, we see that the sample is reasonably well-balanced 
across many indicators even prior to propensity score weighting, although we simultaneously 
observe many statistically significant differences based on the experience of a COVID-19-related 
job or income loss. However, there are some notable differences between the groups. Older 
households, non-students, childless households, and households where the respondent or their 
spouse/partner was retired or unable to work due to a disability were less likely to report a 
COVID-19-related job or income loss. By contrast, full-time students or households where the 
respondent or their spouse/partner were self-employed or employed part-time were more likely 
to report a job or income loss. 










Total 100.00 28.67 71.33    
Age, Mean (SD) 46.9 (16.8) 42.6 (16.3) 48.6 (16.7) -0.36 0.000 
Gender, Female (%) 49.99 44.65 52.14 0.15 0.000 
Race, White (%) 61.78 63.64 61.04 0.05 0.006 
Race, Black (%) 12.28 9.82 13.26 -0.11 0.006 
Race, Hispanic (%) 5.40 4.77 5.66 0.05 0.006 
Race, Asian (%) 17.51 18.99 16.92 -0.04 0.006 
Race, Other (%) 3.03 2.79 3.12 -0.02 0.006 
Children, 0 (%) 74.27 68.04 76.78 -0.20 0.000 
Children, 1 (%) 12.80 16.28 11.41 0.15 0.000 
Children, 2 (%) 9.48 11.51 8.66 0.10 0.000 
Children, 3+ (%) 3.45 4.18 3.15 0.06 0.000 
Student, Full-Time (%) 15.01 20.97 12.61 0.23 0.000 
Student, Part-Time (%) 5.47 7.84 4.51 0.15 0.000 
Student, No (%) 79.52 71.19 82.88 -0.29 0.000 
Ed, Less than HS (%) 0.97 1.03 0.94 0.01 0.000 
Ed, HS Degree (%) 27.87 29.91 27.06 0.06 0.000 
Ed, Two-Year Degree (%) 13.35 13.49 13.29 0.01 0.000 
Ed, Bachelor's Degree (%) 36.20 38.20 35.40 0.06 0.000 
Ed, Graduate Degree (%) 21.61 17.38 23.31 -0.14 0.000 
Housing, Own w/ Mortgage (%) 40.05 40.40 39.91 0.01 0.000 
Housing, Own In Full (%) 26.84 21.11 29.15 -0.18 0.000 
Housing, Rent (%) 28.19 32.26 26.55 0.13 0.000 
Housing, Neither Own/Rent (%) 4.92 6.23 4.39 0.09 0.000 
Health, Excellent/Very Good (%) 52.11 53.81 51.43 0.05 0.189 
Health, Good (%) 34.64 34.16 34.84 -0.05 0.189 
Health, Poor (%) 13.24 12.02 13.73 -0.01 0.189 
Health Insurance, Yes (%) 94.35 92.30 95.17 -0.12 0.000 
Vehicle, Yes (%) 88.50 87.68 88.83 -0.04 0.262 






(72862.7) -0.06 0.049 
HH Income in 2019, Median 70000.0 65000.0 74000.0   






(62147.8) 0.14 0.000 
Liq. Assets pre-COVID, Median 5500.0 4532.5 6000.0   
Bank Account, Yes (%) 96.99 96.77 97.08 -0.02 0.574 
Credit Cards, 0 (%) 9.71 10.34 9.46 0.03 0.791 
Credit Cards, 1 (%) 17.49 17.01 17.68 -0.02 0.791 
Credit Cards, 2 (%) 22.81 22.87 22.78 0.00 0.791 
Credit Cards, 3+ (%) 49.99 49.78 50.07 -0.01 0.791 
Emp., Self-Emp. Full-Time (%) 7.27 11.66 5.51 0.24 0.000 
Emp., Self-Emp. Part-Time (%) 3.47 6.96 2.06 0.27 0.000 
Emp., Wage/Salary Full-Time (%) 45.60 43.18 46.57 -0.07 0.000 
Emp., Wage/Salary Part-Time (%) 9.86 18.84 6.25 0.42 0.000 
Emp., Unemployed (%) 14.17 12.68 14.77 -0.06 0.000 
Emp., Retired/Disabled (%) 19.63 6.67 24.85 -0.46 0.000 
Partner Emp., Self-Emp. Full-Time (%) 4.98 8.06 3.74 0.20 0.000 
Partner Emp., Self-Emp. Part-Time (%) 1.43 3.08 0.77 0.20 0.000 
Partner Emp., Wage/Salary Full-Time (%) 27.20 29.84 26.14 0.08 0.000 
Partner Emp., Wage/Salary Part-Time (%) 4.44 7.26 3.30 0.19 0.000 
Partner Emp., Unemployed (%) 8.60 8.50 8.64 -0.01 0.000 
Partner Emp., Retired/Disabled (%) 12.57 5.43 15.44 -0.30 0.000 
Partner Emp., No Spouse/Partner (%) 40.78 37.83 41.97 -0.08 0.000 
Observations 4,757 1,364 3,393     








Total 46.99 53.01    
Age, Mean (SD) 45.8 (16.6) 47.0 (16.7) -0.07 0.070 
Gender, Female (%) 49.10 50.62 0.03 0.409 
Race, White (%) 62.59 61.57 0.02 0.545 
Race, Black (%) 10.55 12.56 -0.06 0.545 
Race, Hispanic (%) 5.35 5.49 0.03 0.545 
Race, Asian (%) 18.48 17.37 -0.01 0.545 
Race, Other (%) 3.03 3.02 0.00 0.545 
Children, 0 (%) 72.86 75.03 -0.05 0.494 
Children, 1 (%) 13.69 12.28 0.04 0.494 
Children, 2 (%) 9.86 9.28 0.02 0.494 
Children, 3+ (%) 3.60 3.42 0.01 0.494 
Student, Full-Time (%) 16.30 14.44 0.05 0.166 
Student, Part-Time (%) 6.08 5.39 0.03 0.166 
Student, No (%) 77.62 80.17 -0.06 0.166 
Ed, Less than HS (%) 0.87 0.93 -0.01 0.978 
Ed, HS Degree (%) 27.09 27.60 -0.01 0.978 
Ed, Two-Year Degree (%) 13.27 13.41 0.00 0.978 
Ed, Bachelor's Degree (%) 37.04 35.92 0.02 0.978 
Ed, Graduate Degree (%) 21.73 22.15 -0.01 0.978 
Housing, Own w/ Mortgage (%) 40.60 40.19 0.01 0.408 
Housing, Own In Full (%) 24.70 27.22 -0.06 0.408 
Housing, Rent (%) 29.61 27.78 0.04 0.408 
Housing, Neither Own/Rent (%) 5.09 4.80 0.01 0.408 
Health, Excellent/Very Good (%) 52.92 52.26 0.01 0.732 
Health, Good (%) 34.75 34.42 -0.03 0.732 
Health, Poor (%) 12.34 13.32 0.01 0.732 
Health Insurance, Yes (%) 93.82 94.63 -0.04 0.296 
Vehicle, Yes (%) 88.26 88.80 -0.02 0.623 
HH Income in 2019, Mean (SD) 87157.9 (69552.4) 88230.5 (70042.1) 0.02 0.662 
HH Income in 2019, Median 71000.0 70000.0   
Liq. Assets pre-COVID, Mean (SD) 25782.0 (55876.2) 28281.5 (60599.3) -0.04 0.255 
Liq. Assets pre-COVID, Median 5500.0 5800.0   
Bank Account, Yes (%) 97.08 96.97 0.01 0.845 
Credit Cards, 0 (%) 9.07 9.53 -0.02 0.326 
Credit Cards, 1 (%) 15.80 17.59 -0.05 0.326 
Credit Cards, 2 (%) 22.17 22.99 -0.02 0.326 
Credit Cards, 3+ (%) 52.96 49.89 0.06 0.326 
Emp., Self-Emp. Full-Time (%) 7.85 7.11 0.03 0.048 
Emp., Self-Emp. Part-Time (%) 4.07 3.09 0.05 0.048 
Emp., Wage/Salary Full-Time (%) 46.45 45.79 0.01 0.048 
Emp., Wage/Salary Part-Time (%) 11.06 9.37 0.06 0.048 
Emp., Unemployed (%) 14.26 14.24 0.00 0.048 
Emp., Retired/Disabled (%) 16.32 20.40 -0.10 0.048 
Partner Emp., Self-Emp. Full-Time (%) 5.27 4.78 0.02 0.246 
Partner Emp., Self-Emp. Part-Time (%) 1.64 1.11 0.04 0.246 
Partner Emp., Wage/Salary Full-Time (%) 29.25 27.36 0.04 0.246 
Partner Emp., Wage/Salary Part-Time (%) 5.07 4.17 0.04 0.246 
Partner Emp., Unemployed (%) 8.41 8.56 -0.01 0.246 
Partner Emp., Retired/Disabled (%) 10.84 13.08 -0.07 0.246 
Partner Emp., No Spouse/Partner (%) 39.52 40.93 -0.03 0.246 
Observations 2,236 2,521     
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the sample after the use of generalized boosted 
regression modeling to estimate propensity score weights for the likelihood of experiencing a 
COVID-19-related job/income loss. We observe that the application of propensity score weights 
was highly effective at balancing the two groups on observable characteristics. The largest 
standardized difference was -0.1—well below the typical threshold—and all other indicators 
have even smaller standardized differences. 
The Impact of COVID-19-Related Job and Income Loss on Financial Distress 
Having demonstrated that the use of propensity score weights substantially improved balance, 
we turn now to addressing our first research question concerning the extent to which job and 
income losses due to COVID-19 are associated with a greater likelihood of experiencing 
financial distress, which we operationalize through measures of households falling behind on 
their expenses or using high-cost financial resources. Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. 
Across all eight outcome measures—skipping essential bill payments, carrying credit card debt 
from month-to-month, falling behind or going into collections on credit card debt, overdrafting 
bank accounts, using payday loans, using title loans, using pawn shops, and selling blood 
plasma—we see that COVID-19-related job and income losses are significantly associated with 
increases in these outcomes. In many cases, the effects are quite large. COVID-19-related job 
and income loss functionally doubled the rate of skipping essential bill payments (from 8.4% to 
18.0%; p < 0.001), falling behind on credit card debt (from 5.9% to 12.2%; p < 0.001), selling 
blood plasma (from 4.4% to 8.3%; p < 0.001), and using a pawn shop (from 5.4% to 11.0%; p < 
0.001). The impacts of COVID-19-related job and income loss on the other measured outcomes 
is somewhat more attenuated, but remain both large and statistically significant. 
 









Hardship and Debt Outcomes    
  Skipped Essential Bills, Past 3 Months (%) 17.99 8.39 0.000 
  Carried Credit Card Debt, Past 3 Months (%)a 37.30 29.83 0.000 
  Behind/In Collections on Credit Card Debt, Now (%)a 12.16 5.86 0.000 
  Account Overdraft, Past 3 Months (%) 13.52 8.92 0.000 
High-Cost Financial Resource Usage    
  Auto Title Loan, Past 3 Months (%) 9.97 7.64 0.017 
  Payday Loan, Past 3 Months (%) 8.78 5.97 0.002 
  Blood Plasma Sales, Past 3 Months (%) 8.33 4.42 0.000 
  Pawn Shop, Past 3 Months (%) 10.98 5.41 0.000 
Weighted Observations 2,236 2,521   
aRestricted to households with credit cards (n=4,276)    
 
The Role of Liquid Assets in Moderating the Impacts of COVID-19-Related Job and Income 
Loss 
To address our final two research questions concerning the moderating role of liquid 
assets, we estimate a series of propensity score-weighted linear probability models. Tables 4 and 
5 present the results of these estimates across the study outcomes. Each measured outcome has 
two sets of model estimates. The first set estimates the effects of COVID-19 job/income loss and 
liquid assets on each outcome independently, corresponding to Equation 1 above. The second set 
estimates the moderation effect of liquid assets on the impacts of COVID-19-related job/income 
loss by interacting the two variables, corresponding to Equation 2 above. 




















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss 0.092*** 0.144*** 0.063*** 0.088** 0.058*** 0.095*** 0.040*** 0.051* 
  (0.011) (0.024) (0.016) (0.030) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.021) 
Liquid Assets, 2nd Quartile -0.042* -0.050** -0.034 -0.043 -0.053*** -0.044** -0.056*** -0.065*** 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Liquid Assets, 3rd Quartile -0.123*** -0.062*** -0.208*** -0.195*** -0.111*** -0.073*** -0.099*** -0.086*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.023) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Liquid Assets, 4th Quartile -0.100*** -0.044** -0.305*** -0.263*** -0.088*** -0.062*** -0.102*** -0.083*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*2nd Q LA 0.013  0.017  -0.020  0.019 
  (0.036)  (0.049)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*3rd Q LA  -0.130***  -0.027  -0.081**  -0.027 
  (0.028)  (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*4th Q LA  -0.121***  -0.092*  -0.057*  -0.041 
  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.602*** 0.576*** 0.512*** 0.496*** 0.577*** 0.555*** 0.596*** 0.590*** 
  (0.102) (0.101) (0.123) (0.125) (0.097) (0.097) (0.087) (0.087) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity Score Weighting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,757 4,757 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,276 4,757 4,757 
R-squared 0.180 0.189 0.218 0.220 0.175 0.178 0.152 0.153 
aRestricted to households with credit cards        
 
Table 4 presents model estimates for hardship and debt outcomes. Estimates of Equation 
1 are in odd-numbered columns, and estimates of Equation 2 are in even-numbered columns. We 
observe that, almost universally, higher levels of liquid assets are associated with significant and 
substantial reductions in the probability of experiencing a measured hardship or debt outcome. 
Relative to being in the bottom quartile of liquid assets, respondents in higher liquid asset 
quartiles tend to report experiencing these outcomes at lower rates, and those in the third and 
fourth quartiles tend to experience better outcomes than those in the second.  
 We also observe that, in many cases, liquid assets moderate the relationship between 
COVID-19-related job and income loss and modeled outcomes. For example, households in the 
third quartile of liquid assets prior to the pandemic who experienced a COVID-19-related 
job/income loss were 13 percentage points less likely to report skipping essential bills than 
households in the bottom liquid asset quartile who experienced a job/income loss (p < 0.001). 
However, liquid assets only appear to have a protective effect on falling behind on credit card 
debt in the event of a COVID-19-related job/income loss if respondents were in the fourth liquid 
asset quartile prior to the pandemic (β = -0.092; p < 0.05), and they were less likely to report 
carrying credit card debt in the event of a job loss if they were in the third (β = -0.081; p < 0.01) 
or fourth (β = -0.057; p < 0.05) liquid asset quartiles.  Liquid assets did not appear to have any 
protective effect on the likelihood of account overdrafts in the event of a job or income loss.  
To give a better sense of the magnitude of these relationships, Figure 1 presents the 
marginal probability of experiencing a given financial distress measure, conditional on the 
experience of COVID-19-related job loss and the household’s pre-pandemic liquid asset quartile. 
This figure demonstrates both how precarious the financial lives of the asset poor are, and the 
extent to which high levels of liquid assets protect households. Taking the rate of skipping 
essential bills during the pandemic as an example, after correcting for differential propensities to 
experience a COVID-19-related job/income loss and applying covariate controls we estimate that 
31% of households in the bottom liquid asset quartile who had a COVID-19-related job/income 
loss skipped essential bills , as compared to 16% of households in the lowest liquid asset quartile 
who did not experience a job/income loss. By contrast, households in the third and fourth liquid 
asset quartiles experienced these measured outcomes at similar rates, regardless of whether or 
not they had a COVID-19-related job/income loss. 
 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities of Experiencing Expense or Debt Hardships, by Liquid Asset 
Quartile and COVID-19-Related Job/Income Loss (Propensity Score Weighted) 
 
Note: This figure presents the predicted probabilities of the models from the even-numbered 
columns in Table 4, which examine the interaction between COVID-19-related job/income loss, 
liquid assets, and hardship and debt outcomes. N=4,757 for skipped bills and account overdrafts; 
N=4,276 for unpaid credit card calances and being behind on credit card debt. CC=credit card.    
 
In Table 5, we estimate the same two models for high-cost financial resource usage. In 
these models, we again observe that higher amounts of prepandemic liquid assets are correlated 
with lower rates of using high-cost financial resources, relative to those in the bottom quartile of 
liquid assets, and that those in the third and fourth liquid asset quartiles tend to be less likely to 
draw on these resources than those in the second quartile. However, we also see that 
prepandemic liquid assets only moderate the impact of COVID-19-related job/income loss for 
certain high cost resources, namely selling blood plasma and pawning items. Liquid assets do not 
significantly moderate the relationship between COVID-19-related job/income loss and payday 
loan usage or auto title loan usage. 
Figure 2 presents the marginal probabilities of using high cost financial resources, 
conditional on prepandemic liquid asset quartile and the experience of COVID-19-related job 
loss. In this figure, the moderating effect of liquid assets is clear when examining blood plasma 
sales and pawn shop usage. For example, 15 percent of households in the bottom liquid asset 
quartile and 8 percent of households in the second liquid asset quartile who had a COVID-19-
related job/income loss reported selling blood plasma over the prior 3 months, as compared to 6 
percent and 4 percent of those in the bottom and second quartiles who did not experience a 
job/income loss, respectively. However, this difference between the groups disappears among 
households in the top two pre-pandemic liquid asset quartiles. 


















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss 0.017 0.005 0.024** 0.029 0.035*** 0.067*** 0.053*** 0.077*** 
  (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.019) 
Liquid Assets, 2nd Quartile -0.035** -0.043** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.036** -0.026* -0.046** -0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) 
Liquid Assets, 3rd Quartile -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.030** -0.082*** -0.049*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Liquid Assets, 4th Quartile -0.062*** -0.078*** -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.056*** -0.025* -0.063*** -0.044*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*2nd Q LA  0.017  0.011  -0.023  -0.002 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.028) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*3rd Q LA  0.005  -0.025  -0.054**  -0.069** 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.022) 
COVID-19 Job/Income Loss*4th Q LA  0.035  -0.011  -0.068***  -0.041 
  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
Constant 0.649*** 0.657*** 0.620*** 0.618*** 0.511*** 0.495*** 0.613*** 0.602*** 
  (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.094) (0.093) 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity Score Weighting Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 4,757 
R-squared 0.158 0.158 0.176 0.177 0.166 0.169 0.189 0.192 
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities of High-Cost Financial Resource Usage, by Liquid Asset 
Quartile and COVID-19-Related Job/Income Loss (Propensity Score Weighted) 
 
Note: This figure presents the predicted probabilities of the models from the even-numbered 
columns in Table 5, which examine the interaction between COVID-19-related job/income loss, 
liquid assets, and high-cost financial resource usage. N=4,757. 
 
Robustness Check 
Most of the dependent variables in this study ask about household experiences over the 3 months 
prior to the survey. While this time period covers the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(from late January to mid-May, depending on when the respondent took the survey), these 
outcomes do not necessarily capture the extent to which a given outcome occurred as a result of 
the pandemic. For example, a household could have missed an essential bill payment in the 3 
months prior to the survey for reasons not related to COVID-19 (e.g., inattention to the bill’s due 
date). As noted earlier, if respondents reported experiencing 7 of the 8 outcomes in this study (all 
outcomes except carrying credit card debt from month-to-month), we then asked if they 
experienced a given outcome as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. To confirm that the 
relationships we observed in the main analysis were due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we re-ran 
all of the models in the main analysis using these COVID-19-specific outcomes as dependent 
variables instead of the main analysis’ more general outcomes. Overall, the results of these 
supplemental models were highly similar to those of the main model. The significant 
relationships we observe in the main analysis remain significant, though the magnitudes of the 
relationships differed somewhat—the coefficients on job/income loss and the interaction 
between job/income loss and liquid assets were often somewhat stronger (though not 
exclusively), while the coefficients on liquid assets were often somewhat weaker (though not 
exclusively). As such, we are confident that the relationships we observed in the main analysis 
were due to COVID-19.6 
DISCUSSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked economic havoc on many U.S. households. In this 
study, we examine the association of liquid assets with financial distress, comparing households 
that have and have not experienced job and/or income losses related to COVID-19. Regarding 
our first research question, we find that, unsurprisingly, households that have experienced job 
and/or income losses due to COVID-19 reported greater signs of financial distress such as bank 
account overdrafts and selling blood plasma. These differences hold for all eight distress 
indicators after controlling for a host of household demographic and financial characteristics and 
using propensity score weighting. Regarding our second research question, we find that 
households with liquid assets in the upper 75% of the distribution (roughly $2,000 and above) 
have significantly lowered risk for all eight types of distress compared to households with assets 
in the first quartile. Regarding our third research question, we find that liquid assets significantly 
 
6 Full results available upon request. 
moderate the relationship between the majority of our measured financial distress indicators and 
COVID-19-related job or income loss, but that this moderation effect was only present for those 
in the top two quartiles of liquid assets (roughly $8,000 and above).  
 Though extensive research has demonstrated the value of liquid assets in helping 
households avoid hardship and promoting a general sense of financial well-being, our research 
shows that these protective effects translate to the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic 
and the accompanying economic turmoil. This distinction is not trivial. Research on the 
protective effects of liquid assets generally occurs in the context of relatively normal or stable 
economic conditions. In these conditions, a household faced with a job or income loss has the 
option of looking for work, finding other sources of income, and relying on family and friends to 
help with expenses, in addition to using liquidity to smooth consumption. In the early days of the 
COVID-19 pandemic—during which the data for our study were collected—seasonally adjusted 
unemployment claims increased by a factor of more than 10; an economic shock that was 
unprecedented in both magnitude and rapidity. Given that these job losses were accompanied in 
many cases by stay-at-home orders restricting travel and business hours, it was unlikely that 
households had the option of seeking out additional work to make ends meet, meaning their pre-
pandemic liquid asset buffer may have taken on particular importance during the pandemic. 
 Implications 
Much of the current policy discussions surrounding preparation for future pandemics or large-
scale shocks concerns “building back better” and ensuring that our public health, governmental, 
and economic institutions are better equipped to support the health and well-being of the U.S. 
population in the event of a future crisis. Our research indicates that developing a strategy to 
shore up the often anemic emergency savings and liquidity options of U.S. households should be 
central to these discussions. We briefly discuss three ways of doing so. 
First, policy goals concerning financial inclusion should better emphasize access to and 
use of savings accounts (e.g., the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s "Start Small, Save 
Up" program) to help households build an emergency buffer. The focus on savings accounts 
specifically is valuable, as money held in accounts earmarked for savings tends to be stickier 
than money held in consumption accounts or as cash (Thaler, 1999). Further, roughly a quarter of 
U.S. households lack savings accounts (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2018) and, 
despite efforts like Bank On and the FDIC Model Safe Account template, many banks fail to 
offer affordable products and are unlikely to do so without regulatory changes.  
Second, encouraging private sector innovation can help households develop emergency 
savings. Financial technology platforms like Chime offer affordable checking and savings 
accounts, while platforms like SaverLife and Onward encourage and facilitate saving for 
emergencies. Employers can also play an important role by offering employees’ the ability to 
split their direct deposits into dedicated emergency savings funds; in essence offering a short-
term savings equivalent of employer-sponsored retirement accounts that have benefited middle- 
and upper-income workers.  
However, expanded savings account access is necessary but insufficient in helping 
households—and low-income households in particular—save. These households tend to face a 
high degree of budgetary constraint that makes even meeting essential expenses difficult, and 
saving for the future is harder still. These households need savings incentives and policy 
supports such as a higher minimum wage and universal basic income, which can help households 
meet immediate consumption needs and build liquid assets to be more financially resilient. 
Absent these large-scale policy reforms, policymakers could help expand existing economic 
supports to help households build savings. For example, the tax refund is often the single largest 
payment that low-income households receive in a given year (Roll, Russell, Perantie, & 
Grinstein-Weiss, 2019) and presents an opportunity for tax filers to build their savings, yet 
savings deposit rates at tax filing remain low (Roll, Grinstein‐Weiss, Gallagher, & Cryder, 
2019). Policymakers could help households better capitalize on their tax refund by offering 
savings incentives, such as those proposed by the Refund to Rainy Day Act. 
Though helping households, and low-income households in particular, build liquid assets 
is essential to support their well-being and a tangible way to confront rising wealth inequality, 
these efforts can also help increase the population’s resiliency to future pandemics. Following 
stay-at-home orders, social distancing, and minimize the risk of exposure and transmission of a 
virus require individuals to be able to afford to stay home. Increasing households’ liquid assets 
are a direct way to do that, and to help families avoid the terrible choice of risking their health or 
risking hunger, eviction, and an array of other hardships.
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